PUBLISHED on November 2, 2025
The latest round of negotiations held in Istanbul, Turkey, from October 25 to 30, 2025, between the Afghan Taliban and Islamabad ended with an interim agreement to implement the previously agreed ceasefire in Qatar. Further technical details of the interim agreement will be discussed during the next round of negotiations which begins on November 6, 2025. The international mediation and continued dialogue over the past weeks bodes well; However, prospects for a successful dialogue and resolution of the conflict between Islamabad and the Afghan Taliban remain slim and unpredictable.
This is mainly due to the deterioration of bilateral relations between the two neighbors since August 2021. Before Turkey and Qatar, China also made efforts to give peace between the two neighbors a chance in a series of trilateral talks, but without success. Four main factors make peace efforts between the two actors inherently fragile, thereby decreasing the likelihood of lasting peace.
First, Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban do not have a common understanding or unified position on their main point of contention: the issue of terrorism and the Taliban’s support for the Fitna al Khwarj (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)) and the Fitna al Hindustan (Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).
Since 2021, Islamabad has consistently urged Kabul to take decisive action against the TTP and BLA, citing the role of these groups in exacerbating Pakistan’s security challenges, particularly in the tribal border regions and Balochistan province. Conversely, the Afghan Taliban claim to have no control over the TTP or BLA.
In particular, they have a soft spot for the TTP, given their shared religious ideology and decades-long historical experience as insurgent movements. For these groups, the use of force – including acts of violence and terrorism – is often seen as a legitimate tool to assert authority over the targeted population. This fundamental divergence of views on the central issue significantly undermines the prospects for a substantive and lasting resolution to the conflict between Kabul and Islamabad.
“The Afghan Taliban claims that they have no control over the TTP or the BLA. In particular, they have a soft spot for the TTP, given their shared religious ideology and decades of historical experience as insurgent movements.”
Second, the dialogue started in 2025 after a deadly conflict between the two countries should ideally have started in 2021, when the Afghan Taliban took power and the TTP, emboldened by the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, reactivated its operations and intensified its terrorist activities in Pakistan.
More importantly, the two neighbors were expected to engage at different levels and on different platforms to negotiate various issues of common concern, such as border security and management, repatriation of refugees, counter-terrorism and relocation of the TTP from Afghanistan.
The prolonged delay and lack of willingness in such engagement between Kabul and Islamabad has further aggravated the pre-existing trust deficit – a historical feature of Pakistan-Afghan relations largely rooted in the issue of Kabul’s irredentist claims to the Durand Line. Instead of addressing the realities on the ground and the sources of the trust deficit, both sides have resorted to mutual accusations and blame-shifting.
Therefore, these belated diplomatic efforts, after years of mistrust, will require significant time and commitment to rebuild trust – particularly at the local level, where communities on both sides of the border express a genuine desire for conflict resolution and confidence-building measures.
A third important factor shaping relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the complex geopolitical environment, particularly India’s recent efforts to maintain friendly ties with the Taliban regime in Kabul. Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi in October 2025 was seen by many as an Indian effort to diplomatically isolate Pakistan and create a two-pronged challenge that could strain Islamabad’s strategic position and capabilities.
The entire South Asian region, and Afghanistan in particular, is already facing serious socio-economic challenges and political uncertainties. Such geopolitical maneuvers by India and the Afghan Taliban could further destabilize the region, leading to serious impacts on development and human security.
It is imperative that India recognizes the fact that provoking the diplomatically and politically inexperienced Taliban will not limit the ensuing conflict and its repercussions to Afghanistan and Pakistan alone; rather, it will create long-term regional consequences that all South Asian states will have to bear.
Finally, peacebuilding, negotiation and conflict resolution require that all parties possess both the political will and diplomatic capacity to engage constructively. In the case of the Afghan Taliban, it appears they are missing both. Their close association with the TTP and other militant and insurgent groups undermines their willingness to confront and resolve the conflict with Pakistan, especially since the heart of the dispute lies in the Islamic Emirate’s continued logistical and political support for the TTP and the BLA.
In terms of capabilities, Taliban leaders also suffer from limited diplomatic exposure and training. The Taliban politburo in Qatar had already demonstrated a certain degree of political maturity due to its sustained visibility and engagement with the international community that resulted in the 2020 peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban.
“More importantly, the two neighbors were expected to engage at different levels and on different platforms to negotiate various issues of common concern such as border security and management, refugee repatriation, counter-terrorism and relocation of the TTP from Afghanistan.”
However, once the Taliban returned to power, they removed the leadership of the Qatar office, leaving its members with little influence over important Taliban decisions. The significant role played by Mullah Yaqoob – former Taliban commander and current Taliban Defense Minister – during the first round of negotiations in Qatar showed that the Taliban was approaching this issue from a position of power rather than with an element of diplomatic and political will and maturity – a factor which further diminishes the prospects of a negotiated settlement for Pakistan and Afghanistan.
It is imperative to consider these four critical factors when seeking a substantive and lasting solution to the Kabul-Islamabad conflict. In this context, Turkey and Qatar, as influential mediators, can play a central role in persuading the Afghan Taliban to recognize the serious humanitarian consequences of protected conflict for the Afghan population, who are already experiencing one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world, marked by restricted access to livelihoods, climate catastrophe, food insecurity and gender apartheid.
Sadia Sulaiman is an Assistant Professor at the Center for Regional Studies for Africa, North and South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.
