Argued that the maintainability of the appeal rests exclusively with the SC and cannot be exercised by the Registrar.
ISLAMABAD:
Former Prime Minister Imran Khan and his wife, Bushra Bibi, challenged in the Supreme Court on Monday the registrar’s decision to return their petitions against the Islamabad High Court’s refusal to suspend their sentences in the ₹190 million Al-Qadir Trust case.
The couple filed a chambers appeal through their counsel, advocate Salman Safdar, under Order V, Rule 3 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2025, challenging the Registrar’s June 29 decision to remand their petitions against the April 30 order of the IHC.
The appeals chamber argued that the clerk’s office is primarily vested with administrative and procedural powers related to the filing and processing of cases.
“These powers are limited to ensuring compliance with procedural requirements, including review of form, limitation, and other prescribed defects, and do not extend to the adjudication of substantive or justiciable issues,” the appellate division held, adding that determining maintainability, particularly when it involved the interpretation of constitutional or statutory provisions, was a judicial function requiring the application of legal reasoning and consideration of competing arguments.
This jurisdiction “belongs exclusively to the Supreme Court and cannot be exercised by the clerk in an administrative capacity,” he specifies.
The appeal further claimed that, in returning the petitions, the Registrar’s Office failed to take into account the crucial aspect that under Article 175-A of the Constitution, any judgment, decree, final order and award of the High Court could be appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) where the law expressly provides for it.
He argued that Section 32A of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) provides for a second appeal to the FCC from a High Court decision under Section 32 of the Ordinance after a first appeal is denied.
“However, the NAO does not expressly provide for an appeal against an order made following an application for suspension of a sentence, even where such an application arises from an appeal under section 32 of the Ordinance,” the Appeals Chamber said.
