The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Mines and Mineral Minerals bill is an update of the 2017 law, with the main objective of attracting national and foreign investments, improving transparency and limiting illegal exploitation to take advantage of the vast mineral resources of the province for economic development.
This complete legislation, detailed in a recent white paper, deals with governance, application and economic development while prioritizing transparency and environmental responsibility. Definitions have been refined and key roles now require qualified mining engineers or geologists selected in merit. The Appeal Court, previously chaired by the Mineral Secretary, will now be led by a former high court judge to ensure impartiality. New organizations, such as the Mineral Investment Authority Facilitation and a mineral test laboratory, aim to attract investors and improve technical surveillance.
The 2025 bill extends its scope through the province, with special provisions for districts and subdivisions merged until December 31, 2030, guaranteeing progressive integration which respects local customs. The bill emphasizes transparency thanks to a legally binding online mining cadastre system, obliges environmental and social guarantees and prioritizes community rights, CSR and local employment.
Similarly, it aims to establish a special mines force to prevent illegal extraction and the creation of a court of appeal for independent mines for fair justice. The strength of special mines is a key provision of the bill, aimed at applying regulations and limiting illegal exploitation. The force is designed to combat illegal exploitation and stop the “mafia” occupying mineral resources in KP, in particular in the tribal districts merged, where around 3,500 mines are dormant or unregulated.
It will be a uniform unit with powers to record the FIR, carry out arrests and stop illegal mining activities, including the entry of the equipment. The force will operate under the KP Mineral Development Authority, a new body proposed in the bill to supervise licenses, permits and application. A special court for mines and minerals will provide rapid trials within 120 days, supported by dedicated police stations. This contrasts sharply with the robust lack of application of the 2017 law, promising a repression of unauthorized activities.
The controversy relating to less advantages for local communities is probably due to different political interpretations of its provisions, in particular in the merged districts, where communities have historically supported mineral resources. The 2025 bill considerably improves the advantages of local communities compared to the law of 2017 by prioritizing their access to mineral titles, protecting customary actions and guaranteeing environmental restoration.
Thanks to the minimum requirements of local content, the law provides for mining companies to prioritize local employment, to obtain goods and services of neighboring companies and to invest in community development projects such as schools and health establishments. It also includes an interest without contribution to 10% free transport for the province, generating income that can finance regional infrastructure. Unlike the law of 2017, which lacked explicit mandates, the 2025 bill guarantees that communities, in particular in the merged districts, benefit economically through jobs and contracts.
The bill sparked political controversy with various criticisms expressing concerns concerning federal excess. One of the controversies concerns section 6 (I), which allows the license authority to implement not only the recommendations of the mineral investment Authority (MIFA), but also the suggestions of the Federal mineral wing. Since mining is a provincial subject under the 18th amendment, this clause has aroused concerns about federal surpassing in the legislative and administrative fields of KP.
However, the bill explicitly stipulates that the license authority can “implement the recommendations of the mineral investment Authority and can implement the suggestion of the federal mineral wing in relation to the powers and functions of the license authority” (article 6 (i)). This was considered a discretionary provision, not compulsory.
The bill also emphasizes provincial autonomy by demanding that the license authority to ensure coherence between the provinces (article 6 (2))), which aligns with the devolution of mining by the 18th amendment to the provinces. The role of the federal mineral wing is advisory and its suggestions are subject to provincial approval, ensuring that the province retains ultimate control.
The reconstruction of the MIFA under article 19 also aroused controversy. The organization, previously made up of seven members, including the Minister of Mines and Mineral Development, should now extend to 14 members, including five provincial ministers. The bill also enables the president of the MIFA to coopte anyone as a member, according to a move, criticisms open the door to politicization and non -transparent appointments.
It should be clear that the expansion of the MIFA at 14 members, including provincial ministers and a federal representative (article 19 (2)), aims to improve the coordination and representation of stakeholders. The inclusion of the federal contribution (clause (l)) is limited to a “guest” member, preserving provincial domination.
The power of the president of Coopt The members (article 19 (3)) is balanced by the requirement of transparency in the annual MIFA reports (section 20 (3)), which must be disclosed publicly via the mining cadastre system (section 9 (5)).
Stakeholders in the private sector have also expressed concerns about Section 2 (KK), which require joint ventures with public companies for any large -scale mining project involving a capital investment of 500 million or more rupees.
Critics argue that if this decision is left to the discretion of the government, without a ratio or clearly defined partnership conditions, it will act as an obstacle to the free participation of the market, thus deteriorating the confidence of investors.
It becomes more and more important to clarify that the requirement of joint ventures with companies belonging to a government in large -scale mines (capital investment above 500 million rupees) is clearly indicated by provident that terms and conditions, including partnership ratios, will be “determined by the government” (section 2 (KK)).
This allows flexibility to negotiate terms on a case -by -case basis, rather than imposing rigid ratios. The exemption from cement factories and the KHYBER PAKHTULKHWA (article 46)) factories of minerals.
Likewise, criticisms also discussed treatment with the bill on strategic and rare minerals. These must be defined and notified by the provincial government, or on the councils of the federal mineral wing via MIFA. The absence of clear definitions or fixed criteria in the bill has led to apprehensions that precious mineral resources can fall under central control.
However, strategic minerals are explicitly listed in Appendix I (paragraph 9), while rare earth minerals are defined as those declared by the provincial government via the notification of Gazette (Section 2 (SSS)). The bill does not give in control of the federal government; Instead, KP retains the power to designate and regulate these minerals (section 27 (2)). The role of MIFA is advisory (article 20 (1) (K)) and the final decisions are based with the provincial government.
Finally, several clauses further extend advisory powers to the federal mineral wing on key operational and financial issues such as the structure of the fees, pricing formulas, model agreements, the powers of the license authority and mining application systems.
The advisory role of the Federal Mineral Wing in fees of fees (section 19 (F)), pricing formulas (section 19 (g)) and model agreements (section 19 (i)) depends on the examination and recommendations of MIFA. For example, fees are prescribed by the provincial government (article 84), and MIFA recommendations must align with KP policies (article 20 (1)). The mining cadastre system (section 9) and license processes (section 6) are administered provincially, ensuring that federal contributions remain non -binding.
The new executive provides for the creation of auctions at the provincial and district levels to manage the transparent and competitive mineral rights auctions. In addition, a defined mortgage mechanism, allowing holders of mineral titles to obtain funding through their own assets without mortgage the mineral title itself.
The bill balances provincial autonomy with pragmatic collaboration, guaranteeing KP control over its mineral resources while allowing a structured federal-provincial dialogue. It establishes a daring vision of sustainable growth. The main guarantees include discretionary language, transparency mechanisms and provincial surveillance. The concerns concerning the obstacles to federal surpassing or investors are attenuated by the explicit provisions of the bill for the provincial discretion and the specific flexibility in the case.
The writer is the information advisor to the chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Warning: The points of view expressed in this play are the own writers and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of PK Press Club.TV.
Originally published in the news
