Experts say this is not the first time the country has found itself at the center of a geopolitical advance
KARACHI:
After nearly six weeks of conflict between the United States, Israel and Iran, Islamabad negotiated a two-week ceasefire, maintaining a careful balance throughout, avoiding aligning with either side while quietly working to open avenues for de-escalation.
Less than two hours before US President Donald Trump’s deadline for Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz – who warned that “an entire civilization would die tonight, never to be brought back” – Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced that the two sides had agreed to an immediate ceasefire.
The praise that followed was swift and global, with world leaders lining up to congratulate Pakistan.
However, for those who have followed Pakistan’s diplomatic history closely, this is not the first time that Pakistan has found itself at the center of a geopolitical advance – and this trend, much like the ceasefire itself, is worth examining.
The country has a discreet but consistent history of making itself indispensable at times when the world’s great powers cannot, or will not, speak directly to each other.
One such example occurred in 1971, when Washington and Beijing had not spoken for more than two decades.
The first signals were transmitted via Islamabad: Pakistan’s secret channels to China gave then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a secret route to Beijing. His secret flight, routed via Islamabad, made Nixon’s historic 1972 visit to China possible.
This led to Nixon’s famous handshake with Mao Zedong and broader détente between the two countries, accompanied by U.S. recognition of Communist China.
Pakistan not only facilitated a meeting, it also helped restructure the world order.
According to Ambassador Masood Khalid, “In 1971, Pakistan was instrumental in bringing the United States and China closer together, and this changed world politics.” “Chinese leaders still recognize our contribution today. American leaders like Dr. Kissinger have also recognized our role,” he added.
Major General (retd) Inam ul Haque went further: “Pakistan was instrumental in bringing China and the US closer in the 1970s. As far as our balancing act between China and the US is concerned, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and establishment are very experienced in this field. We have been traveling this narrow diplomatic path for a long time and we have done so with great success.
A decade and a half after contributing to the rapprochement between the United States and China, Pakistan was again at the center of the story. The 1988 Geneva Accords, which ended the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, were made possible in large part because of Pakistan’s role as a key channel for the Afghan mujahideen and a key interlocutor between Washington and Afghan factions.
The accords, a bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, included the United States and the Soviet Union as guarantors. It set the conditions and timetable for the return of refugees and the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
Although the unrest in Afghanistan continued after the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan, through strategic maneuvering in its diplomatic relations, managed to bring the United States and the Soviet Union closer together during the tense period of the Cold War, with both powers remaining committed to non-interference and non-intervention.
The price Pakistan paid for this role was concrete and lasting.
Pakistan’s economy had to feed millions of Afghan refugees for nearly a decade, while the country absorbed the drug trafficking and gun factions that the war had seeded on its western border — consequences that would define Pakistani society for a generation.
Then came Doha in 2020, when Pakistan again quietly played an instrumental role in bringing the Taliban to the table, thereby facilitating the deal that was celebrated internationally as a historic diplomatic achievement.
The Doha Accords, also known as the Agreement to Bring Peace to Afghanistan, allowed Pakistan to leverage its relations with Washington and its influence with Taliban leaders to help end a long-running war.
The deal included combat restrictions for both sides as well as the withdrawal of all NATO forces from Afghanistan in exchange for counterterrorism commitments from the Taliban.
“Whether it is the Geneva Accords or the Doha Accords, Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to peace and its ability to achieve it,” Ambassador Khalid said.
Pakistan’s former permanent representative to the United Nations, Dr. Maleeha Lodhi, in a 2021 interview, also credited Islamabad for its role in the negotiation process.
She said Pakistan was keeping the channel of communication open with the Taliban, adding: “Had we not done so, Pakistan would not have been able to play the constructive role it played in assisting in the sequence of events that led to the Doha agreement between the United States and the Taliban.” »
However, the commitments of the agreements were not kept. Part of the Doha pact ensured that Afghanistan would not allow any terrorist group to use its soil to attack any foreign country. Yet in the years since, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has become stronger, not weaker, operating from Afghan territory with training camps in Kunar, Nangarhar and Khost. Pakistan helped secure a deal that backfired directly on itself.
The dividend question
Three moments, three generations, a surprisingly consistent pattern – and one question that doesn’t go away: What did Pakistan really walk away with? The Geneva Accords left Pakistan to manage millions of Afghan refugees and a narco-weapons economy that would haunt it for decades.
Doha has produced neither security nor economic reward, only a more emboldened Taliban on its border and a growing insurgency within. In 2025, Pakistan faced six times more terrorist incidents than in 2020, the year the Doha Accords were signed.
Nixon’s opening to China also reshaped the world, but Pakistan remained on the sidelines of what followed.
According to Khalid, “Whether or not Pakistan has reaped strategic dividends is debatable.” “I don’t think it can be assessed as a net loss or gain, it depends on the current situation and the geopolitical dynamics of the time,” he said.
