In the Pakistani context, it is difficult to ignore the extent to which the elite anti-corruption body National Accountability Bureau (NAB) has been seen over the years as both a necessary instrument of accountability and a tool of political contestation. On the one hand, the idea of an independent agency empowered to combat abuse of public office and misappropriation of state resources is compelling. On the other hand, repeated arrests of opposition politicians, sometimes subsequently unproven, have raised concerns about their selective enforcement, lack of clear evidence, and political victimization. For example, several members of the current federal cabinet and even the current Prime Minister, Shehbaz Sharif, ended up in NAB detention before being acquitted by the court.
The case story of Shehbaz Sharif is revealing. In September 2020, the NAB arrested him in a case of money laundering and assets beyond his means. His son, Hamza Shehbaz Sharif, was also the subject of NAB investigations: in June 2019, he was arrested in the Lahore High Court on charges of money laundering and having assets beyond his means. But then, in July 2023, an accountability court acquitted the father and son in the Rs7 billion money laundering case, after the NAB investigation reportedly failed to find evidence. In February 2025, another reference to the Ramzan Sugar Mills case, alleging misappropriation of public funds of Rs 213 million against them, was also dismissed on the grounds that the amount had fallen below the new threshold of Rs 500 million. Such high-profile episodes fuel the perception that NAB procedures risked being shaped by the political context rather than strictly by the merit of the evidence.
It is in this context that the recent legislative amendments to the National Accountability (Amendment) Act, 2022 and the National Accountability (Second Amendment) Act, 2022 deserve special attention. These amendments revised the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAO) to redefine the jurisdiction of the NAB: matters of federal, provincial or local taxation, decisions of federal and provincial cabinets/committees and regulatory bodies were excluded from its scope. The definition of corruption and corrupt practices was amended to require proof of monetary gain and a monetary threshold of Rs 500 million and above was introduced for cases to fall within the scope of NAB investigation. These changes are explicitly aimed at channeling NAB resources towards large-scale financial wrongdoing and avoiding overreach in decision-making and regulatory areas where abuse may be less easily quantifiable.
After the amendment, the NAB introduced internal reforms: establishment of a Central Complaint Cell (CCC) at headquarters and complaint cells in regional offices to review incoming complaints within fixed time limits; the mandatory conditions for registering complaints; discourage anonymous or pseudonymous submissions by making applicants liable if the intention is in bad faith; submit affidavits/undertakings from complainants; replace the term “Accused” with “Accused” and keep his identity confidential until proven guilty; establish Accountability Facilitation Cells (AFCs) for parliamentarians (under the Speaker/President) and bureaucrats (under the Establishment Division/Chief Secretaries); Business Facilitation Cells (BFCs) at NAB headquarters and regional offices to promote transparency and business-friendly processes; and internal accountability mechanisms such as an internal accountability cell, monthly open public hearings in regional offices, and visitor feedback systems.
Operationally, there has been digitalization: electronic recording of witness statements, AI-based electronic investigation tools (for bank accounts, transaction analysis), a paperless e-office system, new sub-offices in remote/strategic areas (Gwadar, Chaman), and a right of audience for the accused at any stage of the case, and a high-level committee to review cases at any stage for errors/omissions. The Pakistan Anti-Corruption Academy (PACA) was established to strengthen the capacity of the institution and to adopt modern global methods and techniques of research and investigation.
The reported impact of these reforms is significant: business confidence is said to be on the road to recovery, thanks to closer liaison with chambers of commerce; collaboration with ministries would have improved the confidence of bureaucrats; the number of initial complaints fell from 2,338 to 1,639 and after verification from 79 to 20, suggesting more rigorous monitoring and fewer frivolous cases. A new Land Directorate has been created through which over 4.53 million acres of government land, valued at around eight trillion rupees, has been reclaimed. Additionally, Rs 124.86 billion was returned to 121,635 citizens affected by Ponzi schemes and housing frauds through a transparent online system.
NAB’s actions against money laundering have also been notable. Successful operations were carried out in 21 high-profile cases involving illegal assets worth around Rs 118 billion. To trace foreign assets, NAB has signed memorandums of understanding with several countries, including Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Australia, China, Sri Lanka, Russia and Tajikistan, and strengthened information exchange through Interpol and other international networks.
Since its inception, NAB has recovered Rs 883.58 billion in 23 years till February 2023. Remarkably, between March 2023 and October 2025, or just two years and seven months, the recoveries stood at Rs 8,397.75 billion. In total, NAB recovered Rs 9,281.33 billion (9,280 billion), an unprecedented achievement compared to accountability agencies across the world. Interestingly, in the last two years, NAB received a budget of only Rs 15.33 billion, meaning that for every rupee spent, Rs 548 was recovered, a ratio that sets an example globally.
The hope is that these reforms mark the beginning of a more balanced architecture of accountability: one in which the watchdog is seen not as the weapon of the victor but as the guardian of the public interest, one in which investigations are based on clear evidence rather than reasons of political expediency; a situation where businesses and the bureaucracy feel safe rather than targeted; and one where ordinary citizens, the ultimate actors of public accountability, see restitution, fairness and transparency assured. If these ambitions are confirmed, the office could gradually restore public confidence and emerge as a truly credible mechanism for holding power to account.
(The author is a governance specialist)
