Some Bitcoin developers are no longer wondering whether quantum computing will break the network, but are letting onlookers know how much time it would take to prepare if that ever happens.
This shift was crystallized this week by longtime Bitcoin developer Jameson Lopp, who said that while quantum computers are unlikely to threaten Bitcoin anytime soon, any significant defensive changes could take much longer than many think.
“No, quantum computers will not break Bitcoin in the near future,” Lopp posted. “We will continue to observe their progress. Yet making thoughtful changes to the protocol (and unprecedented migration of funds) could easily take 5-10 years.”
Loading…
The discussion is important because the value of Bitcoin increasingly depends on long-term trust. As more institutional capital treats bitcoin as a multi-year holding, even remote technical risks can influence allocation decisions and shape how markets price uncertainty, as CoinDesk reported Saturday.
Lopp’s argument was less about whether Bitcoin would survive quantum computing and more about how much time the network would actually need if it were ever to respond.
His comment reframed the debate away from immediacy and toward logistics. Even though quantum machines capable of breaking Bitcoin’s cryptography are decades away, the work required to update software, infrastructure and user behavior would be measured in years, not months.
And that’s a significant amount of time for quantum computing research, funding, and hardware capabilities to advance in ways that reduce timelines faster than expected.
Bitcoin relies on elliptic curve cryptography to secure wallets and authorize transactions. In theory, sufficiently powerful quantum computers running Shor’s algorithm could derive private keys from exposed public keys, putting old address formats at risk.
The network wouldn’t collapse overnight, but coins that have already revealed their public keys could become vulnerable.
Bitcoin changes take time
Bitcoin’s conservative governance model – one of its main strengths – also makes large-scale transitions difficult.
Any move towards quantum-resistant cryptography would require new address formats, wallet upgrades, exchange support, and most importantly, user action. Billions of dollars worth of bitcoins would have to be voluntarily moved.
This reality partly explains why some investors remain worried. Big dispatchers don’t need quantum computers to exist tomorrow to care about the problem today.
For institutions holding Bitcoin as a long-term asset, the question is whether the network can coordinate major changes before they are forced.
Proposals such as BIP-360 aim to fill this gap by introducing quantum-resistant address types and allowing a gradual transition over time. But no timetable has been set and no migration has started.
For now, quantum risk remains theoretical. Lopp does not mean that Bitcoin is in danger, but rather that the preparation, if it ever becomes necessary, will take more time than the debate itself.
