The Shanghai cooperation organization summit in Beijing took place in an increased climate of regional expectations.
What has long been considered a largely rhetorical platform for Eurasian cooperation is to reshape regularly by Beijing and Moscow in something more oriented towards development.
During the meeting, the management of China announced measures to establish a SCO development bank and promised a new line of credit and flexible loans spread over the next three years.
The amount may not be impressive in global financial terms, but for the Member States faced with economic distress, including Pakistan, the message was undoubtedly: this forum will not only discuss safety and multipolarity, but will also start to channel funds and invest in tangible projects.
For Islamabad, this promise comes at a time when the breathable space is rare, and each dollar counts.
The summit was also remarkable for the contrast of your between the addresses of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
Modi, appearing in China for the first time since the violent border affair in Ladakh in 2020, has remained closely to the themes that India has always raised in such rallies. He spoke of terrorism as a universal threat, clearly indicating that states supporting violent networks would ultimately be confronted with consequences.
He also repeated India’s reserves on cross-border infrastructure corridors that do not respect sovereignty, a veiled reference to the Belt and Road initiative and in particular the alignment of CPEC via Gilgit-Baltistan.
Modi used the opportunity to emphasize that the favorite regional connectivity model of India lies in companies such as the Port project of Chabahar and the international North-South transport corridor, which, according to Delhi, strengthens confidence rather than Enfenture at the disputed borders.
Shehbaz Sharif, on the other hand, echoed the language that Beijing has returned to the heart of the OCS: respect for territorial integrity, mutual development and inclusive cooperation.
By carefully supervising Pakistan’s position around sovereignty while leaning simultaneously in the promise of deeper industrial, technological and agricultural cooperation, his discourse aimed to neutralize the recurring criticism of India and to crop Pakistan as an essential partner in the new economic chapter of the block.
Beyond the plenary, Sharif’s commitments in Tianjin and bilateral meetings have strengthened the message that Islamabad wants to transform the second phase of CPEC into a history not only of roads and power plants, but skills, factories and innovation.
It was a script designed to launch Pakistan not as a supplicant but as a voluntary participant in the evolution of SCO. The two leaders, in their own way, recognized the same reality: the SCO moves away from its early identity as a security platform and becomes a forum where development, connectivity and financial support occupy the front of the stage.
But they greatly diverted what it should mean. India considers that the initiative is risky if it legitimate projects that intrude into disputed territory, and it insists that security threats and terrorism must remain the central concern of the group.
Pakistan, on the other hand, considers new financing and the accent based on the project as an opportunity to relieve its budgetary charges, to develop the CPEC in sectors that generate exports and jobs, and to gain legitimacy as a state of corridor.
For Islamabad, the week offered a rare convergence of opportunities. With Chinese support, the loan mechanisms offered by the OSSE could allow Pakistan to access alternatives beyond its exhausting cycle of IMF negotiations.
Even relatively small lines of credit, if they are associated with better governance, could revive promising special economic areas or the modernization of funds in agriculture. The real challenge does not reside in the announcements but in the delivery. To ensure that the supply is transparent, the projects are not politicized and that the infrastructure actually produces productivity gains rather than white elephants.
The government of Sharif is now faced with the difficult task of corresponding to the external commitments of an internal reform.
The approach of India, in turn, was prudent but without compromise. By respecting its well -known position according to which connectivity cannot be imposed without consent and by prioritizing terrorism again, Modi assured that the Delhi file has remained intact.
However, the culture of SCO consensus and its orientation led by China mean that the strongest concerns in India are often diluted in the final press releases. Delhi has risked appearing as a participant whose voice is recorded but not amplified. His answer was to defend his own corridors – Chabahar and Instc – but the credibility of these projects depends on the flow of freight and schedules, not just speeches at the top.
The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a multimodal commercial route (combining the sea, the rail and the road) designed to connect India, Iran, Russia, Central Asia and Europe in a shorter, faster and more profitable way than traditional maritime tracks.
It was designed for the first time in 2000 through an agreement between India, Iran and Russia, and then expanded to include more than a dozen Member States, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and others.
Unless India can demonstrate that its favorite routes can provide faster and cheaper access to Central Asia, the risk is that the economic turn of SCO leaves Delhi more marginal than central. The policy around the summit was, as usual, fueled by optics. Clips of leaders standing together, exchanging brief greetings or attending ceremonial events have drawn disproportionate attention.
Some Indian points of sale have celebrated Modi images in conversation with XI and Putin. Some Pakistani channels highlighted the presence of Sharif alongside the Chinese president during commemorative events.
But the deeper history resided in the discourses and in the financial announcements of the chair. China has strengthened its role as the main architect of the new OCS phase, while Pakistan positioned itself as a beneficiary and a partner in this design.
India has maintained its reservations in principle, ensuring that it could not be accused of disengagement. What could each country gain or lose from this change? For Pakistan, the potential gain is twofold: new financial commitments that diversify its external options and diplomatic coverage in a block that amplifies its partnership with China.
The symbolism of being put at the heart of SCO connectivity is precious at a time when domestic pressures go up. For India, risk is not immediate isolation but a progressive erosion of influence.
Its insistence on sovereignty resonates at home and among certain external partners, but in a forum where Beijing establishes the tempo, Moscow provides support and the States of Central Asia are impatient to invest, objections of India may seem a background noise, unless they are equaled to viable alternatives.
In the end, the SCO in Beijing stressed that the two rivals of South Asia play different games on the same scene. Pakistan seeks capital, legitimacy and partnership via CPEC 2.0, while India insists on the principle, sovereignty and prudence of security. China, on the other hand, guarantees that the two arguments must be carried out in an arena that it dominates more and more.
The result of this competition will not be decided by the Summit speeches alone. For Pakistan, success depends on the function of external commitments is reflected in functional industrial zones, better managed electrical systems and skills development. For India, it is based on the question of whether its alternative corridors pass from the plan to the functioning of commercial arteries.
The lesson for Pakistan is to welcome new finances but to remain vigilant on the conditions, even when they are not stated as explicitly as those of the IMF programs.
It is only when external support is linked to internal reform that Pakistan has seen sustainable growth. The lesson for India is that the repetition of its red lines is insufficient; It must prove through real infrastructure and exchanges that its connectivity model is more viable than that of Beijing.
The two will have to do more than speak if they want to convert the presence of the summit into a lasting advantage. The SCO may not compete with the BRICS or replace Western financial institutions, but it has exceeded its reputation as a simple photo shoot. It becomes a forum where resources, politics and strategy are just intended enough to shape the results.
Pakistan has left Beijing with money promises and partnership aura. India is found with a reiteration of principles which keep its red lines but do not shape the trajectory of the block.
In the changing geometry of Eurasia, a neighbor seems to have gained a little room to maneuver, the other a reminder of his constraints. Both, however, always determine their altitude through the work they do at home.
Warning: The points of view expressed in this play are the own writers and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of PK Press Club.TV.
The writer holds a doctorate from the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom. He publishes @naazirmahmood and can be reached:[email protected]
Originally published in the news
