In October 2025, Pakistan closed all major Western crossing points with Afghanistan. Pakistan said the closures were necessary due to escalating tensions and TTP-related attacks originating from Afghan territory. The current regime does not promise a return to normal in the near future.
The immediate costs of the shutdown were borne by traders, transporters, laborers, workers and border communities who rely on cross-border movements for both economic and social reasons.
Cross-border trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan is central to the economy of the border regions. It begins before the customs gate, in social ties, reputation, family ties, language, credit and pre-existing business relationships. Much of this trading occurs through trading networks and brokers, whose credibility depends on trust. For people living in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the border is more than a political line between the two countries; it is a long-standing socio-economic space.
From an anthropological perspective, areas near the borders include communities with ties to both countries – the country in which they reside and the country across the line where they have ethnic, linguistic and kinship ties. The official line between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been shaped by centuries of ties; thus, trade in the region is not simply about goods passing through official channels. Much of this financing is also done on credit, given the lack of formal banking and credit systems in the region.
Policies regarding the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan make extensive use of concepts such as regulation, security, closure and control. However, for border populations, the border is not only a question of security but also a locally anchored economy of subsistence and mobility. It provides employment to truck drivers, laborers, warehouse staff, loaders, retailers and customs officers. The border closure not only affects trade figures, but also disrupts income, debts, mobility and daily planning of traders, transport workers and border households.
Business representatives have often cited an earlier high point of around $2.7 billion in trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan, although this figure should be treated as a business estimate because published figures vary widely. A 2018 report in “Profit” indicated that bilateral trade increased from $2.7 billion to $1.2 billion in about 18 months, while other reports placed the previous peak closer to $2.5 billion. Since then, trade has declined considerably. According to the Afghan Ministry of Commerce, reported by Pajhwok, trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan was worth $2.461 billion in 2024 and $1.766 billion in 2025.
The December 2025 report of the Pakistan Trade Development Authority shows that Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan increased from $754 million in July-December 2024-2025 to $336 million in July-December 2025-2026. Imports from Afghanistan also declined, from $419 million to $239 million during the same period. This means that the recorded merchandise trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan increased from around $1.173 billion to $575 million during the first half of 2025-26.
My fieldwork with traders and transporters shows that many traders involved in Pak-Afghan trade had homes and strong networks in Kabul. These networks gave Khyber and Peshawar traders an advantage because they could supply goods to Afghan traders on credit because of the trust between them. My fieldwork with transporters in Karachi reinforces the same point about the importance of these networks.
After the borders closed, profit margins fell sharply, sometimes by more than 50 percent. The livelihood chain attached to a single truck is much broader than that of the single driver, as thousands of households depend indirectly on the trucking economy through people such as drivers, helpers, loading dock staff, mechanics, tire dealers, gas stations, truck stops, warehouses, customs clearance agents, brokers and small traders. The effect of a complete shutdown of truck traffic for a certain period does not stop at transport companies. This will have a knock-on effect on the entire employment structure of the sector.
Today, many traders in Peshawar and Karachi remember a time when travel to and from the border was easier and more familiar. They had homes, relatives, land – and networks of contacts in Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar. For the people of this region, the border has always been a shared space of passage, exchange, kinship and interdependence between the tribal areas and border districts of Balochistan and neighboring Afghanistan.
This is precisely what current politics fails to recognize. The government cannot hope to ensure border security by creating uncertainty in legitimate commerce. While frequent closures may be justified on security grounds, in practice they punish those who have invested time and money in legal commerce to earn a living: drivers, workers, small traders, brokers, and families living near the border. Furthermore, the closure of legitimate lines of communication creates an environment that leads to the development of informal channels and increases capital outflows.
Trade and security must be addressed separately. This does not mean weakening regulations; it means recognizing that legal commerce cannot survive repeated closures and uncertainty. Pakistan’s approach to Afghanistan should be more economically focused, but it remains heavily focused on security. A viable border economy will require clear guidelines for opening borders, improved customs rules, payment systems and consultations with chambers, transport unions, customs brokers and traders in border areas.
Pakistan can manage the Pak-Afghan border more effectively if it views it not only as a site of state control but also as a channel for trade, movement and community ties.
Border communities should not be treated simply as objects of security policy and forced to bear the costs of border closures. They must be recognized as economic actors whose participation is essential to sustainable border management and security. Policies should keep formal trade viable rather than forcing it out of regulated systems.
The author is a political analyst and researcher. He is the author of “Pakistan’s Tribal Borderlands” and can be contacted at: [email protected]
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policies of PK Press Club.tv.
Originally published in The News
