Leave Apple, Intel and Nvidia in the dust? Huawei could join Samsung as the only technology company producing its own processors, SSDs and DRAM

Reports indicate that Huawei is building and operating DRAM manufacturing plants in a joint venture with state-controlled SwaySure.
This is part of an alleged network of 11 factories that Huawei operates behind public facades that it denies exists.
The move, seen as an attempt by Huawei to secure HBM’s captive supply of its increasingly powerful Ascend AI chips, could put the company above Apple, Intel and Nvidia, none of which make their own memory.

Growing evidence suggests that Huawei is taking the same approach that saw it build processors and AI chips in the past to DRAM in the present.

The Chinese tech conglomerate is reportedly building and operating DRAM manufacturing plants on the continent, putting it in direct competition with just one major player of the same size, but for a much broader consumer base: Samsung.

Drawing on media reports and semiconductor analyst publications, Block and files has published claims (which Huawei currently denies) that the company is potentially building and operating DRAM manufacturing plants through a joint venture with Shenzhen-based memory maker SwaySure, giving it effective control over at least 11 different semiconductor manufacturing plants in the region.

A decision born from a necessity imposed by the sanctions

Despite its ramifications and Huawei’s denials, this claim is not new: the first link between the two companies dates back to 2025, when the Financial Times released satellite images of Huawei’s advanced chip production line that linked it to SwaySure and cited state financial support for the facilities shown.

Huawei’s so-called decision didn’t happen in a vacuum, however; it finds itself in a situation where the Chinese state is increasingly and aggressively defending it, not just covertly but openly, on multiple fronts, as it responds to Washington-backed sanctions that limit and, in some cases, virtually eliminate its ability to access cutting-edge silicon.

The overt part is easy to identify: the Semiconductor Industry Association estimates that Huawei receives $30 billion in public funding from the central government and its hometown of Shenzhen to build its chip array, while another 2019 estimate puts the lifetime figure at $75 billion in public support.

The government also banned its tech giants from purchasing AI chips from AMD and Nvidia, while pushing Huawei’s Ascend line to the de facto standard in the Chinese market, securing Huawei revenues it would otherwise have had to compete for.

The secret part is much harder to identify, but just as crucial: China would also tolerate a network of shadow factories that is, at least on paper, not directly associated with Huawei but is, for all intents and purposes, a branch of the giant, the opacity making it difficult to pin down the direction and scale of Huawei’s ambitions in space. This is also the reason why the United States uses the designation on the entity list of Huawei subsidiaries: Washington is trying to pierce a veil constructed expressly by Beijing.

Ironically, the strongest corroborating signal comes from Huawei’s adversary: the U.S. government’s designations on the Entity List imply that BIS investigators have concluded that these companies operate as a single network, which is as close to official confirmation as is currently available.

Huawei’s move stems from a voracious appetite for AI-centric high-bandwidth memory (HBM), which sanctions ensure it cannot source directly from international suppliers as the United States has tightened export controls to keep it, at least legally, out of Chinese hands.

While a Huawei manufacturing its own DRAM would be a notable step forward, it could be more of a potential future supplier to Apple than a direct competitor, as Apple is toying with the idea of purchasing memory from Chinese manufacturers to alleviate its own supply issues.

Huawei’s products, however, compete with Apple in the smartphone segment, with Intel’s server processor offerings and with Nvidia’s artificial intelligence chips, although the latter has struggled to gain a foothold in what was once one of its largest markets by revenue.

He appears to have Samsung’s Western position in his sights as he moves toward zero Chinese dependence on suppliers that Washington can sanction, but he has a lot of catching up to do to stand up to the current king of the hill. Samsung holds a 3-4 year lead over HBM, arguably the largest gap, over China’s CXMT, while its lead in DRAM is much narrower and closing in on China-based memory makers considerably faster.

Chinese manufacturers have meanwhile achieved relative parity in NAND flash used in SSDs, an increasingly important space for AI, although Huawei still relies on SMIC for CPU and GPU manufacturing, a process about two nodes behind industry leader TSMC.

Huawei, at least on paper, has its own designs but does not manufacture them itself, leaving that task to other specialist companies. But if the report is true, it could well become the first real challenger to Samsung’s position as a chip designer, manufacturer and memory supplier rolled into one.

Google logo on black background next to text